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n the last issue of this magazine, James Robert Brown
(Brown 2017) asked, ‘‘Is anyone really agnostic about 2
+ 3 = 5, and willing only to give assent to PA  2
+ 3 = 5?’’ (where PA stands for the Peano axioms for
arithmetic). In fact, Brown should qualify his ‘‘anyone’’
with ‘‘anyone not already hopelessly corrupted by philos-
ophy,’’ since, as he knows full well, there are plenty of so-
called nominalist philosophers—myself included—who,
wishing to avoid commitment to abstract (that is, nonspa-
tiotemporal, acausal, mind- and language-independent)
objects, take precisely this attitude to mathematical claims.
Why on earth might one question such a basic claim as
‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’? First of all, we should be clear about what is
not being questioned. That two apples plus three more
apples makes five apples is not something that is in ques-
tion, and neither is the generalized version of this, ‘‘For any
F, if there are two Fs, and three more Fs, then there are five
Fs.’’ Of course this generalisation may fail for some Fs
(think of rabbits or raindrops), but suitably qualified so that
we only plug in the right kind of predicates as replace-
ments for ‘‘F,’’ this generalization will not worry nominalist
philosophers of mathematics—indeed, each of its instances
are straightforward logical truths expressible and derivable
in first-order predicate logic, without any mention of
numbers at all.
But isn’t this what ‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’ really says? That any two
things combined with any three more (combined in the
right kind of way so that no things are created or destroyed
in the process) will make five things? If we only understood
‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’ as a quick way of writing a general claim of
the latter sort, then again nominalist philosophers of
mathematics would not worry.1 But ‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’ as a
mathematical claim is more than a mere abbreviation of a
generalization about counting. This can be seen in the fact
that it has logical consequences that are not consequences
of the generalisation to which it relates. It follows logically
from ‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’ that there is an object (namely, 2), which,
added to three makes 5. And this is not a logical conse-
quence of the general claim ‘‘For any F, if there are two Fs,
and three more Fs, then there are five Fs.’’ For this general
claim can be true in finite domains consisting entirely of
physical objects, with no numbers in them at all. Since
nominalist philosophers question whether there are any
numbers (on the grounds that, were there to be such
things, they would have to be abstract—nonspatiotempo-
ral, acausal, mind- and language-independent—to serve as
1Indeed, it is because of the relation of provable-in-PA claims such as ‘‘(1 + 1) + ((1 + 1) + 1) = ((((1 + 1) + 1) + 1) + 1)’’ (abbreviated, once suitable definitions are
in place, to ‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’), to true logically true generalizations such as ‘‘any two things combined with any three other things make five things’’ that we are interested in
the Peano axioms in the first place. A mathematical Platonist—i.e., a defender of the view that mathematics consists in a body of truths about abstract mathematical
objects—might say that, far from believing that ‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’ on the basis of its following from the Peano axioms, we come to see that the Peano axioms correctly
characterize the natural numbers on account of their implying claims, such as the claim that ‘‘2 + 3 = 5,’’ which we already know to be true of the natural numbers
(something like this line of thinking is suggested by Russell’s (1907) paper, ‘‘The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premises of Mathematics’’). The contention of
this article is that this line of reasoning is incorrect, since we do not know ‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’ to be true of numbers considered as mathematical objects (since we do not
know that there are any such objects). Nevertheless, we can mirror this reasoning from an anti-Platonist perspective to provide a justification for PA over other candidate
axiom systems: we choose to work on this system, and are interested in what follows from its axioms, in no small part because of the relation of its quantifier-free
theorems to logical truths such as the truth that ‘‘For any F, if there are two Fs, and three more Fs, then there are five Fs.’’
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appropriate truthmakers for the claims of standard mathe-
matics), they see fit to question claims such as ‘‘2 + 3 = 5’’
precisely because they logically imply the existence of
objects such as the number 2, which, they take it, may fail
to exist (as in our finite domain example) even though the
general claim ‘‘any two things added to any three further
things make five things’’ is true.
Some philosophers—inspired by the philosopher/logi-
cian Gottlob Frege—try to rule out such finite domains by
arguing that the existence of the natural numbers is a
consequence of an analytic (or conceptual) truth, this truth
being the claim that, effectively, if the members of two
collections can be paired off with one another exactly, then
they share the same number:
‘‘for any F and G, the number of Fs = the number of
Gs if and only if F & G’’
(where ‘‘F & G’’ is short for ‘‘the Fs and Gs can be put into
one–one correspondence’’). This claim (which has become
known as ‘‘Hume’s principle,’’ since Frege first presented
the principle citing its occurrence in Book 1 of David
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1738)), is argued to be
analytic of our concept of number since anyone who
grasps the concept of number will grasp the truth of this
claim.
Since the existence of numbers falls directly out of
Hume’s principle, if Hume’s principle is part of our concept
of number then it follows from this that anyone who grasps
that concept thereby grasps that numbers exist. This
derivation of the existence of numbers from our concept of
number is reminiscent of St Anselm’s ontological argument,
deriving the existence of God from our concept of God as a
being ‘‘than which no greater can be conceived.’’ (Such a
being couldn’t exist merely in the imagination, Anselm
argues, because if we can conceive of God at all then we
can also conceive of Him existing in reality. And since
existing in reality is greater than existing merely in the
imagination, if God existed only in the imagination, we
could conceive of something even greater—a really exist-
ing God—contradicting our definition of God as a being
‘‘than which no greater can be conceived.’’) For nominalist
philosophers, the Fregeans’ derivation of the existence of
numbers from our concept of number is at least as fishy as
this supposed derivation of the existence of God from our
concept of God. Since nominalist philosophers take
themselves to have a concept of number without believing
in the existence of numbers, they will reject Hume’s prin-
ciple as a conceptual truth, believing only that Hume’s
Principle characterises our concept of number in the sense
that, in order for any objects to count as satisfying that
concept, then Hume’s Principle would have to be true of
them, while remaining agnostic on the question of whether
there are in fact any numbers.
But why remain agnostic about whether there are
numbers? And what even hinges on this? Mathematicians
talk about mathematical objects and mathematical truths all
the time, and indeed are able to prove that their mathe-
matical theorems are true. Isn’t it absurd in the face of
accepted mathematical practice to say, ‘‘I know you think
you’ve proved Fermat’s Last Theorem, Prof. Wiles, but
actually since we have no reason to believe there are any
numbers, we have no reason to believe FLT’’? (Actually, the
situation is even worse than that: if there are no numbers,
then FLT is trivially true, since it follow a fortiori that there
are no numbers n[ 2 such that xn + yn = zn, so Wiles’
efforts were truly wasted.) The philosopher David Lewis
certainly thought it would be absurd for philosophers to
question the truth of mathematical claims. As he puts it,
Mathematics is an established, going concern. Phi-
losophy is as shaky as can be. To reject mathematics
for philosophical reasons would be absurd. …
That’s not an argument, I know. Rather, I am
moved to laughter at the thought of how presump-
tuous it would be to reject mathematics for
philosophical reasons. How would you like the job of
telling the mathematicians that they must change
their ways, and abjure countless errors, now that
philosophy has discovered that there are no classes?
Can you tell them, with a straight face, to follow
philosophical argument wherever it may lead? If they
challenge your credentials, will you boast of philos-
ophy’s other great discoveries: that motion is
impossible, that a Being than which no greater can be
conceived cannot be conceived not to exist, that it is
unthinkable that there is anything outside the mind,
that time is unreal, that no theory has ever been made
at all probable by the evidence (but on the other
hand that an empirically ideal theory cannot possibly
be false), that it is a wide-open scientific question
whether anyone has ever believed anything, and so
on, and on, ad nauseam?
Not me! (Lewis 1990: 58–59)
Just to put this in some perspective, David Lewis is the
philosopher best known for believing that, for every true
claim about what’s possible (such as, ‘‘possibly, Trump will
win’’), there’s a world just like our own in respect of its
reality (i.e., physical, concrete, though spatiotemporally
inaccessible to us) at which that claim is actual (i.e., at that
world, there is a counterpart to our own Donald Trump,
who becomes President of that world’s counterpart to our
USA).2 If a philosophical view is so absurd that even David
Lewis can’t stomach it, then maybe it’s time to rethink.
Well if nominalist philosophers are going to find math-
ematics wanting in the way Lewis suggests (calling on
mathematicians to renounce their errors and change their
practices), and indeed if as suggested earlier they’re going
to have to dismiss important results such as Wiles’s proof,
then they probably do deserve to be laughed out of town.
But contemporary nominalists typically wish to leave
2Typically, in presenting Lewis’s account, people appeal to one of his own colourful examples (from Lewis 1986) of a merely possible but nevertheless improbable and
in fact nonactual world, for example, a world in which there are talking donkeys. At time of writing (March 2016), I thought I would pick an alternative possible but surely
similarly improbable (and thus pretty likely to be nonactual) scenario, one in which Donald Trump becomes President. Lewis’s account has as a consequence that
whatever the actual outcome of the 2016 election, there would be some possible world in which Trump won it. What I wasn’t banking on was that that world would turn
out to have been our own.
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mathematics just as it is. Indeed, nominalists can even
preserve mathematicians’ judgments concerning the truth
of their theories and the existence of mathematical objects,
in at least this sense: there is a notion of truth internal to
mathematics according to which to be true mathematically
just is to be an axiom or a logical consequence of accepted
(minimally, logically possible—or coherent) mathematical
axioms, and to exist mathematically just is to be said to
exist in an accepted (minimally, logically possible) mathe-
matical theory. Thus, in expressing his puzzlement over
Frege’s account of axioms in mathematics as truths that are
true of an intuitively grasped subject matter, David Hilbert
writes in response to a letter from Frege:
You write: ‘‘…From the truth of the axioms it follows
that they do not contradict one another.’’ I found it
very interesting to read this very sentence in your
letter. For as long as I have been thinking and writing
on these things, I have been saying the exact reverse:
if the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each
other in all their consequences, then they are true
and the things defined by the axioms exist. This is for
me the criterion of truth and existence (Hilbert, letter
to Frege, 1899 (reprinted in Frege (1980))).
If by truth in mathematics we just mean ‘‘axiom or logical
consequence of a coherent axiom system,’’ and if by exis-
tence in mathematics we just mean ‘‘existence claim that
follows logically from the assumption of a coherent axiom
system,’’ then again the nominalist philosopher will not
baulk at the mathematical truth of the theorems of stan-
dard mathematics, or the mathematical existence claims
that follow from these theorems. Mathematicians are wel-
come to the truth of their theorems, and the existence of
mathematical objects, in this sense.3
But then what is it that nominalist philosophers do baulk
at? In what sense of truth and existence do they wish to say
that we have no reason to believe that the claims of standard
mathematics are true, or that their objects exist? If we agree
that 2 + 3 = 5 is true in this Hilbertian sense (of being a
consequence of coherent axioms), and also true in a prac-
tical applied sense (when understood as shorthand for a
generalization about what you get when you combine some
things and some other things), then what is the nominalist
worrying about when she worries whether this sentence is
really true, or whether its objects really exist? The issue arises
because being true ‘‘in the Hilbertian sense’’ is not always
enough. At least, outside of pure mathematics, the mere
internal coherence of a framework of beliefs is not enough
to count those beliefs as true. Perhaps the notion of an
omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being is coherent,
in the sense that the existence of such a being is at least
logically possible, but most would think that there remains a
further question as to whether there really is a being satis-
fying that description. And, in more down-to-earth matters,
Newtonian gravitational theory is internally coherent, but
we now no longer believe it to be a true account of reality.
Granted this general distinction between the mere internal
coherence of a theory and its truth, the question arises as to
whether we ever have to take our mathematical theories as
more thanmerely coherent—as getting things right about an
independently given subject matter. To answer this, we
need to understand how we do mathematics—how mathe-
matical theories are developed and applied—and ask
whether anything in those practices requires us to say that
mathematics is true in anything more than what I have been
calling the Hilbertian sense.4
It is here that recent debate in the philosophy of mathe-
matics has turned its attention to the role of mathematics in
empirical scientific theorizing. Of course even in unapplied
mathematics, mere coherence isn’t enough.5 Mathemati-
cians are concerned with developing mathematically
interesting theories, axiom systems that are not merely
coherent but which capture intuitive concepts, or have
mathematically fruitful consequences. But accounting for
the role of these further desiderata does not seem to require
that we think of our mathematical theories in the way the
Platonist does as answerable to how things really are with a
realm of mathematical objects (even if there were such
objects, what grounds would we have for thinking that the
truths about them should be intuitive, interesting, fruit-
ful…?). When we turn to the role of mathematics in science,
we have at least a prima facie case for taking more than the
mere logical possibility of our appliedmathematical theories
to be confirmed. In particular, close attention has been paid
to the alleged explanatory role played by mathematical
entities in science. We believe in unobservable theoretical
objects such as electrons in part because they feature in the
best explanations of observed phenomena: if we explain the
appearance of a track in a cloud chamber as having been
3Those familiar with Hilbert’s work will know that, in his correspondence with Frege, Hilbert would have assumed a syntactic notion of logical consequence, so, strictly
speaking, his criterion of truth and existence was deductive consistency (so that an axiomatic theory would be true, mathematically speaking, if no contradiction could
be derived from those axioms). In light of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, we now know that if we take the second-order Peano axioms (with the full second-order
induction axiom, rather than a first-order axiom scheme), and conjoin with this the negation of the Gödel sentence for this theory (defined in relation to a particular
derivation system for it), no contradiction will be derivable from this theory, but nevertheless the theory has no model (in the standard second-order semantics). The
syntactic notion of deductive consistency thus comes apart (in second-order logic) from the semantic notion of logically possibly true. I have used Stewart Shapiro’s
(1997) terminology of ‘‘coherence’’ as opposed to ‘‘consistency’’ to indicate this semantic notion of logically possible truth. This notion is adequately modelled in
mathematics by the model theoretic notion of satisfiability, though I take the lesson of Georg Kreisel (1967) to be that the intuitive notion of logically possible truth is
neither model theoretic nor proof theoretic (though adequately modelled by the model theoretic notion).
4It is worth noting that Hilbert did not stick with his position that noncontradictoriness is all that is required for truth in mathematics, choosing in his later work to interpret
the claims of finitary arithmetic as literal truths about finite strings of strokes (thus straying from his original position that saw axioms as implicit definitions of
mathematical concepts, potentially applicable to multiple systems of objects). This later, also Hilbertian, sense of truth (truth when interpreted as claims about syntactic
objects), is not the one I wish to advocate in this discussion.
5It should be noted that, in speaking of ‘‘mere’’ coherence, I do not mean to suggest that establishing the logical possibility of an axiom system is a trivial matter.
Substantial work goes into providing relative consistency proofs, and of course the consistency—and so, a fortiori coherence—of base theories such as ZFC is
something about which there is active debate.
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caused by an electron, but go on to add ‘‘but I don’t believe
in electrons,’’ we seem to undermine our claim to have
explained the phenomenon of the track. The same, say
many Platonist philosophers of mathematics, goes for
mathematical objects such as numbers. If we explain the
length of cicada periods (Baker 2005, see also Mark Coly-
van’s recent paper in this journal) as the optimal adaptive
choice ‘‘because 13 and 17 are prime numbers,’’ but then go
on to add, ‘‘but I don’t believe in numbers,’’ don’t we simi-
larly undermine the explanation we have tried to give? On
behalf of the nominalist side in this debate, I have argued
elsewhere that while mathematics is playing an explanatory
role in such cases, it is not mathematical objects that are
doing the explanatory work. Rather, such explanations,
properly understood, are structural explanations: they
explain by showing (a) what would be true in any system of
objects satisfying our structure-characterizing mathematical
axioms, and (b) that a given physical system satisfies (or
approximately satisfies) those axioms. It is because the
(axiomatically characterised) natural number structure is
instantiated in the succession of summers starting from some
first summer at which cicadas appear that the theorem about
the optimum period lengths to avoid overlapping with other
periods being prime applies. But making use of this expla-
nation does not require any abstract mathematical objects
satisfying the Peano axioms, but only that they are true (at
least approximately—idealizing somewhat to paper over the
fact of the eventual destruction of the Earth) when inter-
preted as about the succession of summers.
The debate over whether the truth of mathematics, and
the existence of mathematical objects (over and above the
Hilbert-truth and Hilbert-existence that comes with mere
coherence) is confirmed by the role of mathematics in
empirical science, rumbles on. But note that whatever
philosophers of science conclude about this issue, it does
not impinge on mathematicians continuing to do mathe-
matics as they like, and indeed continuing to make
assertions about the (Hilbert)-truth of their theorems and
the (Hilbert)-existence of their objects. Nominalists will
claim that Hilbert-truth and Hilbert-existence is all that
matters when it comes to mathematics, and in this sense it
is perfectly fine to agree that 2 + 3 = 5 (since this is a
logical consequence of the Peano axioms). And they will
agree that this particular axiom system is of particular
interest to us because of the relation of its formally prov-
able claims to logically true generalizations (‘‘If you have
two things and three more things, then you have five
things’’). But to the extent that it is the more-than-mere-
coherence literal truth of mathematics as a body of claims
about a domain of abstract objects that philosophers are
concerned about, whereas nominalists may worry whether
we have any reason to believe that mathematical claims are
true in that sense, perhaps mathematicians can be happy
with Russell’s definition of mathematics as ‘‘the subject in
which we never know what we are talking about, nor
whether what we are saying is true’’ (Russell (1910), 58).
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